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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ According to former Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, responsible government is 'the ultimate guarantee of justice and individual rights'. 13 The rationale for responsible government was further articulated by former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser:
The principle of responsibility -to the electorate and the Parliament -is a vital one which must be maintained and strengthened because it is the basis of popular control over the direction of government and the destiny of the nation. To the extent that it is eroded, the people themselves are weakened. If the people cannot call to account the makers of government policy they ultimately have no way of controlling public policy or the impact of that policy on their own lives. For the government to be truly accountable to the people and Parliament the electoral and Parliamentary machinery must, of course, work effectively and democratically. 14 Responsible government was a recurring theme throughout the 1891 and 1897-98 conventions that drafted the Australian Constitution. However, the delegates rarely turned their attention in any detail to the meaning of responsible government or what it would entail in an Australian federal state. This caused some confusion during the debates, with George Reid for example suggesting that some of his peers were 'rather cloudy as to what responsible government is'. 15 The difficulty of defining responsible government was recognised by John Hackett at the 1891 convention:
Responsible government is a phrase which I would defy anyone in this assembly to define. It is a phrase unknown to the British Constitution. It finds no place in our colonial constitutions … It is unknown except as a newspaper phrase, or an oratorical expression. I will go further, and say this that if the words "responsible government" were adopted in our constitution, and the question of their meaning were referred to a bench of the ablest judges that could be found, they would end by declaring themselves utterly unable to define or to declare their meaning. 16 These difficulties of definition have more recently been recognised by the High Court of Australia. In Egan v Willis, Kirby J stated:
Care must be observed in the use of the notion of 'responsible government' in legal reasoning. It is a political epithet rather than a definition which specifies the precise content of constitutional requirements. As with the notion of 'representative government', it is possible to accept the words as a general description of a feature of constitutional arrangements in Australia without necessarily being able to derive from that feature precise implications which are binding in law. 17 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 13 
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Providing a clear description of responsible government is further complicated by its evolving nature. 18 The characteristics of responsible government are not fixed 19 or immutable and can be 'differently understood by different people or at different times'. 20 As noted by Gleeson CJ, responsible government is 'based upon a combination of law, convention, and political practice … The nature and extent of the responsibility which is involved in responsible government depends as much upon convention, political and administrative practice, and the climate of public opinion, as upon rules of law'. 21 Though it is challenging to define responsible government, it has been possible to identify its core meaning or purpose. At a very general level, there appeared to be a broad consensus in the 1890s constitutional convention debates that responsible government entailed 'responsibility of a ministry to parliament. … [b] ecause parliament represents and is responsible to the people. … [T]he end and object of responsible government is that the will of the people shall prevail'. 22 Similar sentiments have been expressed in more recent Australian case law. 23 By convention, responsible government encompasses the twin notions of collective ministerial responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility. 24 Collective ministerial responsibility requires that Ministers support the decisions of Cabinet and uphold the collective government position. Ministers must not speak against government policy or reveal the deliberations of Cabinet. 25 Further, collective ministerial responsibility requires that the government resign if a vote of no confidence is passed against it in Parliament. 26 Lindell has argued that collective ministerial
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ responsibility is the 'most important and relevant feature' of responsible government in Australia. 27 Individual ministerial responsibility requires that Ministers be accountable to the Parliament for their policies, their own performance and the performance of people and entities within their portfolios. 28 To fulfil this requirement, Ministers are expected to explain their actions and policies to Parliament, inform Parliament of developments in their portfolio, take action to correct problems and, if required, resign their ministerial position. 29 Writing in 1995, Lindell asserted that individual ministerial responsibility was a 'diminished and diminishing notion' due to the strong presence of party politics in Australian legislatures. 30 Nothing has changed since that time to limit the force of his conclusion.
II
Are Ministers in Parliament an essential feature of responsible Government? Responsible government requires Ministers to be accountable to Parliament, which is in turn accountable to the people through the electoral process. However, it is less clear whether this necessarily entails that Ministers are elected to Parliament.
One view of the Westminster system of responsible government requires Ministers to be members of Parliament. 31 Bagehot, who first articulated the features of the Westminster system, thought this membership to be essential for pragmatic reasons. Ministers needed first to learn the business of politics: 'Statesmanship -political business -is a profession which a man must learn while young, and to which he must serve a practical apprenticeship; and in England the House of Commons is the only school for acquiring the necessary skill, aptitude and knowledge.' 32 The notion of Ministers as having served a parliamentary apprenticeship is still present in modern politics. 33 However, Bagehot's ideas require some adjustment to fit the contemporary context. First, it is not uncommon for successful politicians to come to politics in their later years, gaining necessary skills and experiences while no longer 'young'. Second, while Bagehot limits his analysis to the House of Commons, in Australia (and, indeed, the UK), Ministers may sit in the upper house of Parliament and gain necessary experience in that house. While government is not formed in the upper house, it is still an environment in which Ministers may gain skills, aptitude and knowledge about the political process, albeit of a slightly different nature given the role of the upper house _____________________________________________________________________________________ 27 Geoffrey Lindell, 'Responsible Government' in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government (Lawbook, 1995) as a place of review. The different experiences gained in each house may be reflected somewhat in the convention that the Prime Minister must sit in the lower house. Finally, it is possible that political skill and knowledge may be obtained through means other than sitting in a house of Parliament, a possibility not accounted for by Bagehot.
Over time, the presence of Ministers in Parliament has come to be conflated with responsible government. However, it appears that this is more an accident of history than an essential feature of the concept. Indeed, Bagehot notes:
The cabinet, in a word, is a board of control chosen by the legislature, out of persons whom it trusts and knows, to rule the nation. The particular mode in which the English ministers are selected … the rule which limits the choice of the cabinet to the members of the legislature … are accidents unessential to its definition -historical incidents separable from its nature. Its characteristic is that it should be chosen by the legislature out of persons agreeable to and trusted by the legislature. Naturally these are principally its own members, but they need not be exclusively so. A cabinet which included persons not members of the legislative assembly might still perform all useful duties. 34 While Bagehot intended in his final sentence to accommodate ministerial appointments from the unelected upper house of the British Parliament, it could equally provide a rationale for appointing as Ministers people who have not been elected to either house of Parliament.
This debate also featured in the Australian constitutional conventions. Sir Samuel Griffith, subsequently the first Chief Justice of Australia's High Court, declared the requirement that Ministers sit in Parliament to be one of 'many misapprehensions as to what is the essence of the system called responsible government.' He stated:
We are accustomed to think that the essence of responsible government is this: that the ministers of state have seats, most of them, in the lower house of the legislature, and that when they are defeated on an important measure they go out of office. That I venture, with the greatest submission, to say is only an accident of responsible government, and not its principle or its essence.
[Instead] the system depends on these propositions -that the ministers are appointed by the head of the state, the Sovereign, or her representative, and that they may hold seats in Parliament. That is all that will be found in the Constitution of the United Kingdom. They are appointed by the head of the state, and some of them may hold seats in Parliament -a limited number. … [Having ministers with seats in parliament] is not common by any means to the system of responsible government, as it is known throughout the British empire, nor as it is known in the other European country where they have adopted, after profound study, what they believe to be the essential principles of the British Constitution as at present administered. 35 Hence, rather than requiring Ministers to hold seats in Parliament, responsible government implies only that Ministers may hold seats in Parliament. This was echoed in the case of Egan v Willis, where Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted: 'One aspect of responsible government is that Ministers may be members of either House of a bicameral legislature and liable to the scrutiny of that chamber in respect of the conduct of the executive branch of government. 
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III
Responsible Government in the Australian Constitution Responsible government has been variously described as a 'cardinal [feature] of our political system which [is] interwoven in its texture', 37 'part of the fabric on which the written words of the Constitution are superimposed', 38 the 'keystone of our political system' 39 and a 'central feature of the Australian constitutional system'. 40 These strong endorsements of responsible government are at odds with the general tenor of debate at the constitutional conventions. 41 Some delegates at the 1890s conventions were reluctant to incorporate responsible government into the new federal constitutional structure. 42 Many speakers acknowledged the difficulties inherent in responsible government, including the tendency for strong party politics to emerge, 43 and questioned whether responsible government could truly be accommodated in a federal system. 44 John Hackett captured the mood of some delegates at the 1891 convention when he declared: 'either responsible government will kill federation, or federation … will kill responsible government'. 45 Drawing on these concerns, a number of delegates proposed that the draft constitution be sufficiently flexible to allow for the evolution of It is interesting to note that many of these strong judicial pronouncements were made by Isaacs J, who also gave an impassioned speech in favour of responsible government at the constitutional conventions: see Australian politics away from responsible government so as to ensure a system more compatible with federalism or to facilitate the refinement of the system over time. 46 By the conclusion of the convention debates, a tacit agreement had emerged that responsible government should be one of the founding principles of the new Australian federal government 47 -predominantly because it was the system of government the people of the colonies were familiar with. 48 However, no explicit statement to this effect was included in any draft of the constitution bill. 49 In describing the Commonwealth of Australia Bill 1898, Alfred Deakin noted: 'Not only is the very fact of responsible government not set forth in express terms, but the results, as we know them, of the working of responsible government are scarcely more than indicated, even to the practised eye.' 50 The only express embodiment of responsible government within the Australian Constitution as finally enacted is s 64, 51 which establishes that no person may serve as a federal Minister for longer than three months unless he or she is or becomes a member of the federal Parliament. Section 64 reads:
Ministers of State
The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish. Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. Ministers to sit in Parliament After the first general election no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Section 64 evolved over the course of the constitutional conventions. Indeed, the provision requiring Ministers to sit in Parliament was not adopted until the 1897-98 convention. At the conclusion of the 1891 convention, the draft Commonwealth of Australia Bill 1891 did not include any requirement that Ministers sit in Parliamentrather, provision was made that Ministers might sit in Parliament. The relevant section provided:
For the administration of the executive government of the Commonwealth, the Governor-General may, from time to time, appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may from time to time establish, and such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General, and shall be capable of being chosen and of sitting as Members of either House of the Parliament. Such officers shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. 52 During debate, it was repeatedly noted that the constitutions of other nations with a system of responsible government did not generally contain provisions requiring Ministers to sit in Parliament 53 -though, as a matter of practice, it was generally considered expedient for them to do so. 54 In explaining the rationale for the 1891 provision, Sir Samuel Griffith stated that it: practically embodies what is known to us as the British Constitution as we have it working at the present time; but the provisions of the bill are not made so rigid that our successors will not be able to work out such modifications as their experience may lead them to think preferable. It is proposed that the ministers of state … may sit in either house of parliament. That is the practice under what we know as the British Constitution, and no doubt under the practical working of our constitution ministers here will also be required to sit in parliament, except in cases where a minister may for a longer or a shorter time be unable to obtain a seat there. … These provisions introduce what we call responsible government … a government responsible in name and form to the head of the state and in substance to the parliament of the commonwealth. 55 Despite the lack of any requirement that Ministers must sit in Parliament in the 1891 bill, the delegates were satisfied that the section would introduce a system of responsible government into the new federation. 56 The 1891 provision was amended by committee during the 1897-98 convention to include a requirement that Ministers sit in Parliament. The revised provision read: In justifying this change, Edmund Barton, later to become Australia's first Prime Minister and a member of the High Court, stated that the clause would ensure that the continuance in office of Ministers would be 'subject to the vote of Parliament' and, as a result, that Ministers would be subject to parliamentary control. 57 Barton further stated:
If the hon member is in doubt that the system of government under which the machinery of this Bill will operate will be responsible government as we understand it, that doubt will be altogether removed by the requirement of the presence of Ministers in Parliament. 58 Section 64 was further described by Barton as a 'safeguard [of] responsible government'. 59 Later in the 1897-98 proceedings, a further amendment proposed by the House of Assembly of Tasmania would have removed the requirement that Ministers sit in Parliament. 60 In the debate that ensued, a number of delegates again pressed the desirability of keeping the constitutional provisions sufficiently flexible to allow for changes to the system of responsible government. 61 Further, it was noted that the provision was unnecessary to secure responsible government. 62 The proposed amendment failed by a vote of 21 to 14. The result was s 64 as it is currently expressed in the Australian Constitution.
Compared to other constitutional questions, whether Ministers should sit in Parliament received only limited attention at the conventions. Indeed, during the 1891 convention Philip Fysh declined to comment on a draft section on the basis that he doubted 'whether the general public has any particular interest at the present moment in the method in which you will frame your executive, and in the mode in which your duties will be discharged.' 63 In the highly politicised federation process, the issue was not regarded as a key concern. 64 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
III COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
At the time of Federation, the constitutions of other nations with a system of responsible government did not generally contain a provision requiring Ministers to be members of Parliament. 65 Modern constitutions are more likely to provide for this, as detailed in Table 1 below, which sets out the relevant constitutional provisions in a number of Westminster systems. The Indian, Irish and Pakistani Constitutions exempt the Attorney-General from the need to sit in Parliament. 66 In Ireland, the exemption appears to reflect a desire for the Attorney-General to be independent from the executive: indeed, the Constitution explicitly provides that the Attorney-General 'shall not be a member of the Government.' 67 The Irish Attorney-General is described as 'the adviser of the Government in matters of law and legal opinion' and is responsible for prosecuting crimes. 68 Given this conception of the role of the Attorney-General, a degree of independence from the executive is to be expected.
In contrast, in India and Pakistan the Attorney-General is exempt due to the need for specialist expertise that is not necessarily available within the ranks of Parliament. Under the Indian Constitution, the Attorney-General must be 'qualified to be appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court'. 69 To satisfy this condition, a prospective Attorney-General must be a citizen of India and have been either a Judge of a High Court for at least five years or an advocate in the High Court for at least ten years or, in the opinion of the President, be a distinguished jurist. 70 This expertise might not be available within the ranks of Parliament at any given time, thereby justifying the exemption of the Attorney-General from the requirement to sit in Parliament. Similar provisions apply under the Pakistani Constitution. However, in Pakistan a prospective Attorney-General must have been an advocate in the High Court for at least fifteen years and there is no provision for the appointment of a 'distinguished jurist', 71 further limiting the likelihood that the necessary expertise will be present in Parliament. Constitution of India (India) art 76(1).
70
Constitution of India (India) art 124(3). While the need for independence is most relevant to the role of the AttorneyGeneral, it is conceivable that other ministerial positions might also benefit from specialist expertise. There is increasing recognition internationally that Ministers appointed from outside Parliament can play significant and valuable roles in national governance. The experiences of countries such as the UK, Scotland and Canada illustrate the potential advantages and challenges associated with external ministerial appointments and provide models that could inform how Australia might adopt such a process within its constitutional framework.
As countries without any express constitutional requirement that Ministers must sit in Parliament, the UK and Canada provide interesting insights into how external Ministers might be appointed and accommodated in a system of responsible government. While Scotland requires the appointment of Ministers from members of
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Parliament, the Scotland Act 1998 (UK) also makes provision that certain specialist executive positions may be filled other than by parliamentary members.
A United Kingdom
Ministers in the UK have traditionally followed a similar 'pathway to power' to their Australian counterparts. By convention, UK Ministers are appointed from Parliament. 72 However, Ministers have occasionally been appointed from outside Parliament to provide expertise and experience that is otherwise lacking. 73 In 2007, Prime Minister Gordon Brown commenced building a 'government of all the talents' ('Goats') that included six Ministers appointed from outside Parliament. 74 The appointments included technocrats from business and science, former politicians, and 'hybrids' with experience in both technical policy and politics. 75 The Goats' appointments differed from previous external ministerial appointments in both their timing, in that individuals were immediately appointed to a ministerial portfolio without first developing an understanding of Parliament, and in their numbers. 76 The Goats were appointed to the House of Lords as life peers, thereby becoming accountable to that House. 78 While this ensured some level of accountability for the Ministers, it relied upon the existence of an unelected second chamber. 79 The practice _____________________________________________________________________________________ 78 Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, 22.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ has been criticised for reinforcing an undemocratic appointment process and resulting in peerages for life for external Ministers even if their term as a Minister was short lived. 80 The UK experience reveals a number of strengths and challenges associated with the appointment of external Ministers. The size and complexity of modern government can mean that there is greater need for technocratic skills in ministerial portfolios. 81 There is also increasing recognition that politicians are being drawn from a shrinking pool of talent, 82 particularly given the rising number of career politicians without other expertise. 83 In the UK, there is growing acknowledgment that external ministerial appointments allow governments to access talent beyond this limited pool. 84 For example, in the case of Lord Digby Jones, it was recognised that his appointment facilitated much stronger linkages between government and business. 85 The range of expertise held by Brown's Goats, as illustrated by Table 2 above, demonstrates one of the potential advantages of external ministerial appointments.
Despite these advantages, a number of limitations emerged. Brown's Goats were often criticised for having a high failure rate based on their typically short time in office, 86 as revealed in Table 2 . These 'failures' were attributable in part to a lack of political and parliamentary skills. There is evidence that the Goats struggled with the parliamentary function, 87 reflecting their lack of a political apprenticeship. 88 A recent report into these issues has recommended a number of reforms to address these problems, including formal induction processes, the setting of clear objectives for new Ministers and the possibility of mentoring. 89 There was also recognition that external Ministers who have both technocratic and transferrable political skills are most likely to be successful in managing the transition. Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, 22-3. 81 Yong and Hazell, above n 2, 7; Lord Turnbull quoted in Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, Ev 1; Sir John Major quoted in Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, Ev 36. 82 Yong and Hazell, above n 2, 9, 14; Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, 9-10; Powell quoted in Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, Ev 1; Sir John Major quoted in Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, Ev 30. 83 Yong and Hazell, above n 2, 9, 14; Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, 11-12; Professor King in Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, Ev 2. 84 Yong and Hazell, above n 2, 14; Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars, above n 2, 13-14. See Bagehot's theory of political apprenticeship, above n 32. 89 Yong and Hazell, above n 2, 37, 39, 40. 90 Ibid 85.
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269 ____________________________________________________________________________________ members of Parliament. 91 As a result, most Scottish Ministers are drawn from within Parliament so as to ensure that 'the Executive [is] fully accountable to the Parliament'. 92 However, the positions of Lord Advocate and Solicitor General for Scotland may be held by non-Parliamentarians, reflecting the 'lack of appropriately-qualified members who could be appointed Law Officers'. 93 The Lord Advocate is the principal legal advisor to the Scottish government and the Solicitor General is the Lord Advocate's deputy. 94 Historically, the offices of the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General for Scotland were ministerial offices in the UK government. Under the Scotland Act, this ceased 95 and the Scottish Law Officers instead became members of the Scottish executive. The functions of the Scottish Law Officers include prosecuting crime, providing general advice to the First Minister and other Scottish Ministers, representing the Crown in civil proceedings, representing the public interest in litigation and scrutinising bills to ensure they are within the legislative competence of the Parliament. 96 The Law Officers are appointed by the Queen on the First Minister's recommendation with the agreement of the Parliament, and may only be removed with the approval of Parliament. 97 Once appointed, they are considered to have the same status as members of Parliament. As a result, they may exercise any of the functions of Scottish Ministers 98 and may participate in parliamentary proceedings (but cannot vote). 99 Further, as a member of the executive, their actions are subject to scrutiny to ensure they are not incompatible with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and European Community law. 100 101 Following the introduction of the Scotland Act, the two Law Officers became members of the Scottish executive 102 and the Lord Advocate was appointed to Cabinet. This caused some public disquiet, particularly concerning how the Lord Advocate could reconcile his or her various roles as a 'politician, prosecutor and judge-maker'. 103 Concern was also expressed that the Lord Advocate could use the Cabinet role to influence policy without a popular mandate. 104 In 2007 the Lord Advocate was removed from Cabinet, signifying a move toward depoliticising the role and shifting its focus instead towards the prosecutorial function. 105 As a result, the Lord Advocate now only attends Cabinet meetings when required to provide legal advice. However, the Lord Advocate retains the right to address Cabinet. 106 The appointment of Law Officers external to Parliament under the Scotland Act allows access to specific legal expertise that may be otherwise lacking. By providing the Law Officers with the status of members of Parliament (excluding the ability to vote), they are given the power to effectively fulfil their roles and are made subject to a degree of accountability and responsibility to Parliament. However, the depoliticising and reduction of the Law Officer role reflects the public disquiet in Scotland associated with unelected officials having a role in directing government policy.
C
Canada As in the UK, there is no constitutional requirement that Canadian Ministers be appointed from Parliament. However, by convention, Ministers are generally members of that body. In Canada, external Ministers are appointed intermittently -only four have been appointed since 1990. External Ministers are typically appointed in anticipation of being elected into Parliament and most hold office for only a few months before their election (or, more unusually, appointment into a seat in the upper house, the Senate). In the event that they are not successful in obtaining an elected seat, most are removed from their ministerial post within days or weeks. 107 The exception to this trend was Andrew George Latta McNaughton, who retained his ministerial
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271 ____________________________________________________________________________________ office for nearly six months after being defeated in a by-election in 1945. However, given McNaughton's ministry spanned the end of World War II, this exception is less noteworthy given the upheaval that characterised the era. Table 3 below provides the key statistics around external Ministers in Canada. 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ his Senate appointment as 'temporary'. 117 At the time, the Prime Minister said that the appointment was a 'flexible' way to deal with government realities, including the need to have a Cabinet Minister from Montreal. 118 Fortier resigned from the Senate to stand for the House of Commons in 2008 and was defeated in the election. He ceased to be a Minister soon thereafter. 119 Fortier's appointment generated significant disquiet in Canada, particularly because the Prime Minister had previously advocated an elected Senate. 120 Further, it is unclear how much benefit the government received from the appointment. 121 In recent times, external Ministers have not played a major role in Canadian politics. This is in part because attempts to appoint external Ministers have had negative political repercussions, particularly if viewed as an attempt to circumvent the democratic process. 122 Unlike the UK, it appears that the Canadian electorate is strongly adverse to ministerial appointments of unelected individuals -especially when those individuals are not likely to obtain an elected parliamentary seat in the near future. It is likely that Australia's political sensitivities reflect those of Canada more closely than those of the UK. As a result, any Australian process would need to be managed extremely carefully, with strong consideration given to the democratic implications.
IV AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we review Australian constitutional provisions and practice to examine whether or how Australia might adopt external ministerial appointments at the Federal, State and Territory level. Table 4 below.
As this Table demonstrates, 121 See, eg, Wells, above n 120, 22-3. 122 See, eg, 'Canada Politics: Cutting Corners', above n 115; Wells, above n 120, 22-3; Coyne, above n 120, 26; Davis, above n 120, 5; Macdonald, above n 120, 25. Act of Federal Parliament.
B
Constitutional practice in Australia Despite the relative ease with which external Ministers could be appointed in the States and Territories, there has been only limited inclination to do so. As in the UK, constitutional convention in Australia dictates generally that Ministers be appointed from within Parliament, thereby reflecting a strict view of the requirements of responsible government. However, like the notion of responsible government, constitutional conventions are capable of changing in response to contemporary circumstances and changing political values, as has been seen in the UK. 125 As wellestablished habits and practices, 126 
1
Historical Australian constitutional practice The appointment of external Ministers is not unknown in Australia. Prior to Federation, external Ministers were appointed as members of the Queensland government. 127 In one case, George Raff was appointed as a Minister without portfolio in the Herbert government in a period of turbulent political and economic circumstances. In July 1866, Premier Arthur Macalister resigned after a dispute with the Governor over the issuing of inconvertible bank-notes as a response to a financial crisis. The Governor then invited former Premier Robert Herbert and Raff to form a temporary committee to run the affairs of government, despite Raff not being a member of Parliament at the time. In Parliament, Herbert described this arrangement as 'assist[ing] the Governor in managing public affairs until a new Government was… appointed'. 128 Raff continued as a Minister without portfolio until November 1866. 129 The Governor's actions in appointing Herbert and Raff were unpopular with politicians, the media and the public and were regarded as 'overstepp[ing] the limits of responsible government'. 130 However, as Bernays notes, the 'circumstances [in this case] were exceptional'. 131 External Ministers have also been appointed at the federal level of government using s 64 of the Australian Constitution. Two members of the first federal ministry never held seats in the Commonwealth Parliament: the first, Sir Neil Elliott Lewis, was appointed as a Minister without portfolio and chose not to stand for election, relinquishing his ministerial position after four months; 132 the second, Sir James Dickson, was appointed as Minister of Defence but died after 10 days in office, preventing him from standing for election. 133 Other than in these two instances, s 64 has been of limited utility in bringing external expertise into the federal ministry. 
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2
Contemporary Australian constitutional practice The appointment of Bob Carr as Minister for Foreign Affairs following his appointment as a Senator for New South Wales 134 reflects a distinct shift in Australian ministerial appointments. Using the casual vacancy provisions, the Labor government was able to bring external expertise into its Cabinet in a similar fashion to the appointment of external Ministers in Canada. 135 Interestingly, s 64 was not used to bring Carr into the ministry prior to his Senate appointment.
Some commentators praised Carr's appointment, describing him as a 'professional' Minister whose 'long record of understanding international affairs' would help to promote Australia's international interests. 136 However, the appointment was criticised by former Liberal Party federal Treasurer Peter Costello, who said: 'From now on, the Prime Minister can choose any minister from outside Parliament so long as her political party can manufacture a Senate vacancy to accommodate the new entrant. The only limit is the number of senators willing to retire at the disposal of the party machine.' 137 It is not conceivable that the Carr appointment will herald an era of unrestrained external Senate appointments. If nothing else, serving Senators are unlikely to fall on their sword to provide a vacancy for an incoming Minister. The appointment of external Ministers in these circumstances is more likely to continue to occur where a vacancy occurs fortuitously.
Other measures have been used in contemporary State politics to introduce external expertise into ministerial deliberations. In South Australia the Rann Labor government appointed people from outside of Parliament to sit on committees within the Cabinet system. Premier Mike Rann appointed Robert Champion de Crespigny, a prominent South Australian businessman in the mining sector, and Monsignor David Cappo, a leader in the Roman Catholic church, to the Executive Committee of Cabinet, a high level committee responsible for oversight of the South Australian Strategic Plan. 138 As noted above, the Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 66 prevents a Minister from holding office for more than three months unless they are a member of Parliament. Rather than seeking to amend this provision, the government adopted a 'fall-back position' 139 under which the appointees exercised 'considerable de facto executive authority' due to their close ties and access to Cabinet. 140 Like ministerial appointments, these positions were subject to the rules of Cabinet confidentiality and other ministerial ____________________________________________________________________________________ standards. However, they were not subject to parliamentary accountability mechanisms.
Hawker has described Rann's appointments as a way of 'dealing creatively and constitutionally' with a lack of talent in Parliament. 141 The appointments were also generally endorsed by the media, being described in one editorial as a 'masterstroke'. 142 It appears that the appointments have also been beneficial for South Australia -de Crespigny's initiative to accelerate mining exploration in South Australia led to a tenfold increase in mining explorations in five years. 143 More generally, de Crespigny's appointment allowed the South Australian government to forge stronger linkages with business. 144 In his role, Cappo led reviews of South Australia's mental health system and disability provisions and spearheaded a Social Inclusion Initiative. 145 The appointments also generated political controversy. In 2007, de Crespigny was involved in a company which was reportedly seeking to establish a nuclear power plant in South Australia. While publically denied by Rann, suggestions were made that de Crespigny might have obtained information to assist the bid from his role in the Executive Committee of Cabinet. 146 Questions were also raised regarding Cappo's appointment, with critics arguing that it was inappropriate for a senior member of the Catholic Church to have such a high level of influence over government policy. 147 On the other hand, the Rann government was also criticised for failing to heed Cappo's advice in relation to Aboriginal crime gang problems, 148 and some commentators have
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ these contexts, external Ministers might play a useful role in supplementing the pool of ministerial talent.
V REFORM OPTIONS
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that external Ministers are a viable and potentially useful addition to the Australian political landscape, particularly in the Territories where there are few parliamentary members. Further, the Carr appointment demonstrates how Australian governments may seek access to expertise beyond existing ministerial talent. As a result, it is worthwhile to consider how an Australian jurisdiction, if minded to adopt external ministerial appointments, might proceed to do so. This section examines the processes and limitations that could be applied to ensure the effective accountability of external Ministers. We initially focus on the States and Territories, given the greater ease with which such appointments may be introduced in those jurisdictions, and then consider the federal case.
A States and Territories
1
Appointment and removal At the State level, Ministers are appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. Ministers then hold office until a change of government or removal by the Governor on the Premier's advice. 158 Similarly, in the Northern Territory and Norfolk Island, Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the Administrator (by convention, acting on the advice of the Chief Minister). 159 In the Australian Capital Territory, which lacks a Governor or Administrator, Ministers are appointed and dismissed directly by the Chief Minister. 160 External ministerial appointments are likely to be made to meet skill and expertise gaps in government. The person likely to have the best understanding of these gaps is the Premier or Chief Minister. The most appropriate appointment process for external Ministers would continue to give the Premier or Chief Minister ultimate control over external ministerial appointments. Consequently, external Ministers should be appointed in the same way as other Ministers according to the established processes in each State and Territory. The Premier or Chief Minister will also be in the best position to determine whether a Minister warrants removal from their position. Hence, the existing removal processes for Ministers are also appropriate for external Ministers.
2
Accountability The core tenet of responsible government is that there exists a line of accountability from the people (who elect Members of Parliament) to the Executive (which holds office for so long as it retains the confidence of Parliament). 161 Ministers who sit in Parliament are made accountable through participation in question time,
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281 ____________________________________________________________________________________ parliamentary debates and committees and the potential for no-confidence motions. To ensure consistency with the conventions of responsible government, it is essential to establish accountability mechanisms to ensure proper oversight of external Ministers.
International experience reveals a number of potential models for ensuring proper accountability of Ministers appointed from outside Parliament. In the UK and Canada, external Ministers may be appointed to the upper house of Parliament, thereby becoming subject to the same accountability mechanisms as other members of Parliament. 162 While this ensures accountability for external Ministers, it relies upon the existence of an unelected second chamber. 163 Until recently, this arrangement would not have been considered in the Australian context. However, the Carr appointment has flagged the potential for governments to make greater use of casual vacancies to appoint external Ministers to an upper house. The States and Territories that use an appointment process to fill casual vacancies, and thus where this approach might be an option, are New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and, in exceptional circumstances, the Legislative Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory. 164 While casual vacancies could be used to appoint external Ministers, this relies on a vacancy becoming available, which is not a regular or predictable occurrence. Further, the requirement that vacating members be replaced by someone from the same political party 165 limits the scope for this type of procedure to be used by governments. Finally, it is possible that this option would not be popular with the Australian electorate: using an appointment process to select members of Parliament sits uneasily with Australia's democratic traditions and heritage. While an occasional external appointment via a casual vacancy might not meet with public disapproval, it is likely to cause some consternation if it becomes a regular occurrence. As a result, it is worthwhile to consider other models of accountability.
In contrast to the model in the UK and Canada, external Ministers in Scotland are members of the Executive 166 and are considered to have the same status as members of Parliament. As a result, they may exercise any of the functions of Scottish Ministers 167 and may participate in parliamentary proceedings, but cannot vote. 168 Through their participation in parliamentary proceedings, external Ministers may be questioned about the exercise of their functions and can inform Parliament about developments in their portfolio, ensuring a level of accountability. This model is more suited to the Australian context as it allows external Ministers to be accountable to Parliament while not actually requiring their appointment to that body. It is also consistent with the models separately proposed by Hawker and former Prime Minister Bob Hawke. 169 In
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ their models, external Ministers would also be subject to ministerial codes of conduct, thereby providing a further form of accountability and scrutiny. 170 The Scottish legislature is unicameral. In the Australian setting, bicameral legislatures (except in Queensland and the self-governing Territories) complicate the issue of accountability. Traditional models of responsible government suggest that Ministers should generally reside in the lower (elected) house of Parliament. However, there is now clear recognition and practice that Ministers may also sit in an elected upper house. 171 Further, there has been judicial acknowledgement of the role of the upper house in securing government accountability. 172 In the Australian setting, it may be useful for external Ministers to be appointed as 'floating' Ministers with the ability to speak and participate in both houses of Parliament but holding membership of neither house. 173 This would allow external Ministers to be accountable to both houses and to contribute their expertise to hearings in both arenas. In the event Parliament or a parliamentary committee wished an external Minister to answer questions or contribute to discussion, it could request their attendance at question time or during debate. Similarly, the Minister themselves could attend Parliament of their own initiative. It has been argued in the UK that Ministers need to be 'rooted somewhere' to become integrated into the ministerial team. 174 If Australia were to adopt a model of 'floating' Ministers, governments would need to be mindful to ensure that sufficient support structures were in place to integrate external Ministers into the executive team.
A further mechanism for ensuring the accountability of external Ministers would be to subject potential appointees to pre-appointment hearings in Parliament. Preappointment hearings could allow for scrutiny of the ministerial candidate and their suitability for the position 175 and ensure parliamentary participation in the process of external appointments. 176 Pre-appointment hearings have been introduced in the UK for senior public service appointments. Hearings are conducted by the relevant departmental Select Committee in the House of Commons and culminate in a report either endorsing or expressing reservations about the appointment. The Select Committee does not have the ability to vote on or veto an appointment and the government retains the ability to make the appointment despite a negative report. 177 However, the hearings are influential with evidence from the UK suggesting that most candidates would not accept an appointment following a negative report. 178 
